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In recent years, critical scholarship has drawn attention to increasing power differentials between corporations that use
data and people whose data is used. A growing number of scholars see digital data and information commons as a way to
counteract this asymmetry. In this paper I raise two concerns with this argument: First, because digital data and infor-
mation can be in more than one place at once, governance models for physical common-pool resources cannot be easily
transposed to digital commons. Second, not all data and information commons are suitable to address power differen-
tials. In order to create digital commons that effectively address power asymmetries we must pay more systematic
attention to the issue of exclusion from digital data and information commons. Why and how digital data and information
commons exclude, and what the consequences of such exclusion are, decide whether commons can change power
asymmetries or whether they are more likely to perpetuate them.
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This article is a part of special theme on Health Data Ecosystem. To see a full list of all articles in this special theme,
please click here: https://journals.sagepub.com/page/bds/collections/health_data_ecosystem.
The iLeviathan: Trading freedom
for utility
As a concept, ‘Big Data’ started to become an object of
attention and concern around the start of the new mil-
lennium. Enabled by new technological capabilities to
create, store and analyse digital data at greater volume,
velocity, variety and value1 the phenomenon of Big
Data fuelled the imagination of many. It was hoped
to help tackle some of the most pressing societal chal-
lenges: Fight crime, prevent disease and offer novel
insights into the ways in which we think and act in
the world. With time, some of the less rosy sides of
practices reliant on big datasets and Big Data epis-
temologies became apparent (e.g., Mittelstadt and
Floridi, 2016): Data-driven crime prevention, for exam-
ple, requires exposing large numbers of people to pre-
dictive policing (e.g., Perry, 2013), and ‘personalised’
disease prevention means that healthy people have to
submit to extensive surveillance to create the datasets
that allow personalisation in the first place (Prainsack,
2017a). In addition, it became apparent that those enti-
ties that already had large datasets of many people
became so powerful that they could eliminate their
own competition, and at the same time de facto set
the rules for data use (e.g., Andrejevic, 2014;
Pasquale, 2017; see also van Dijck, 2014; Zuboff,
2015). GAFA – an acronym combining the names of
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some of the largest consumer tech companies, Google,
Apple, Facebook and Amazon – have become what I
call the iLeviathan, the ruler of a new commonwealth
where people trade freedom for utility. Unlike with
Hobbes’ Leviathan, the freedom people trade is no
longer their ‘natural freedom’ to do to others as they
please, but it is the freedom to control what aspects of
their bodies and lives are captured by digital data, how
to use this data, and for what purposes and benefits.
The utility that people obtain from the new Leviathan
is no longer the protection of their life and their prop-
erty, but the possibility to purchase or exchange ser-
vices and goods faster and more conveniently, or to
communicate with others across the globe in real
time. Increasingly, the iLeviathan also demands that
people trade privacy and freedom from surveillance
for access to services provided by public authorities
(Prainsack, 2019). The latter happens, for instance,
when people are required to use services by Google,
Facebook, or their likes in order to book a doctor’s
appointment or communicate with a school (see also
Foer, 2017). For many of us, it also happens when
access to a public service requires email.2
This situation has garnered reactions by activists,
scholars and policy makers. Reactions can be grouped
in two main approaches, depending on where the focus
of their concern lies: On the one side are those who
want individual citizens to have more effective control
over their own data. I call this the Individual Control
approach (Table 1). It comprises (a) those who deem
property rights to be the most, or even the only, effect-
ive way to protect personal data, as well as (b) some of
those who see personal information as an inalienable
possession of people. The latter group reject the idea
that personal data should be protected by property
rights and prefer it to be protected via human rights
such as privacy, whereby privacy is understood to be an
individual, rather than a collective right (see Table 1).
Solutions put forward by scholars in the Individual
Control group include the granting of individual prop-
erty rights to personal data (see below), or the imple-
mentation of ever more granular ways of informing and
consenting data subjects (e.g., Bunnik et al., 2013; Kaye
et al., 2015). The spirit of the new European Union
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) tacks
mostly to an Individual Control approach in the sense
that it gives data subjects more rights to control their
personal data – to the extent that some might see it as
granting quasi-property rights.3
The second approach – which I call the Collective
Control approach – comprises of authors who empha-
sise that increasing individual-level control over per-
sonal data is a necessary but insufficient way to
address the overarching power of multinational compa-
nies and other data capitalists. Scholars within the
Collective Control group are diverse in their assessment
of the benefits and dangers of increasing individual-
level control.4 What they all have in common, however,
is that they foreground the use of data for the public
good.5 Many of them see the creation of digital data
Table 1. Main strands of arguments about how to address the asymmetry of power between data subjects
and corporate data users.





(a) individual property protected by property
rights
OR




value (Collective Control group)
inalienable personal possessions that have an
individual and a social component; protected
by individual civil rights and by collective public
ways of control and responsibility
AND/OR
public value of personal data and information
should be enhanced (e.g., data philanthropy,
data commons; see also Taylor, 2016)
Source: Author.
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and information commons as the best way to do this,
often because of the emphasis that commons place on
collective ownership and control. Some authors also see
the creation of commons explicitly as a way to resist
‘the prevailing capitalist economy’ (Birkinbine, 2018:6
291; Hess, 2008; De Peuter and Dyer-Whiteford, 2010;
for overviews see Hess, 2008;7 Purtova, 2017a).
In the following section, I will scrutinise the claim
made by some authors within the Collective Control
group that digital data and information commons can
help to address power asymmetries between data givers
and data takers. Despite the frequent use of terms such
as ‘digital commons’ and ‘data commons’ in the litera-
ture, I argue that the question of what kind of com-
mons frameworks are applicable to digital data and
information, if any, has not been answered with suffi-
cient clarity. In the subsequent part of the paper I will
discuss another aspect that has not received enough
systematic attention in this context, namely the topic
of exclusion. I argue that collective measures to address
power asymmetries in our societies need to pay explicit
and systematic attention to categories, practices and
effects of exclusion. I end with an overview of what
governance frameworks applicable to digital data and
information commons need to consider if they seek to
effectively tackle inequalities. If they fail to do this, they
risk that they are most useful to those who are already
privileged and powerful.
What are commons, and how can they
be governed?
Throughout different times and places, the term ‘com-
mons’ has signified a broad range of phenomena ran-
ging from communal agricultural land, town squares,
campus dining halls, or non-titled citizens (Hess and
Ostrom, 2003: 115). As Charlotte Hess and Elinor
Ostrom observed in the early 2000s, in legal scholar-
ship, the commons have often been used synonymously
with the public domain (Hess and Ostrom, 2003: 114;
see also De Peuter and Dyer-Whiteford, 2010; Litman,
1990) or the non-profit sector (Lohmann, 1992). This
has made the commons a symbol of opposition to ‘pri-
vate property’ and commercial interest. This view is
problematic for two reasons: The first is that it implies
a false dichotomy between private resources on the one
hand, and shared or ‘common’ resources on the other.
Shared resources are often governed by private prop-
erty regimes. Second, the conflation of commons and
‘open access regimes’ – namely resources that are not
owned by anyone – obscure the fact that the very pos-
sibility to govern a resource in a fair and equitable way
requires that someone owns it. If nobody owns it, then
anyone can use the resource as she or he pleases, often
with the result that powerful entities can make better
use of the resource than those with less power. The
enclosure of land and the resulting structure of land
ownership in many countries illustrate this.
But what type of property regime is most appropri-
ate for commons? Following Bromley (1990) I distin-
guish between four main property regimes, depending
the entity that is authorised to decide over the fate of
the thing that is owned (Table 2): The first is state prop-
erty, where ownership and control rest with the state,
which means that state authorities decide about access
and use rights.8 The second is individual property,
owned by individual (natural or legal) persons. The
third type is common property, where property rights
are jointly held by a group who can exclude all others
from accessing, governing and using the object or
Table 2. Types of property regimes (adjusted and expanded from Bromley, 1990).
Property regime type Examples
Public/private
property
Can people be excluded
from access/use/governance?
A State property regime National forests,
state-owned casinos
public Yes – e.g., non-residents,
minors, etc.
B Individual property regime
(can be held by more than




C Common property regime
(res communis)
shared gardens private Yes – typically those
who are not members
of the group that owns
the object/resource
D Open access regime
(res nullius)
the open sea, air n/a No
Prainsack 3
resource. The fourth type is open access regimes9 where
no property rights to an object or resource have been
recognised.
Many of the resources that have traditionally been
associated with commons are governed by state or
common property regimes. Examples include commu-
nity grasslands, forests, or agricultural cooperatives.
Grassland and forest commons could be owned by
the state, for example, but be governed by local com-
munities.10 Agricultural cooperatives are jointly owned
by the people running them. As such they comprise
public and private ownership arrangements respect-
ively. The one regime that seems unsuitable for effective
commons governance is open access (res nullius).
Also the commons scholar and Nobel laureate Elinor
Ostrom and her collaborators saw the right and the pos-
sibility to exclude people from the commons as key to the
governance of commons.11 This stands in stark contrast
to scholars who see commons as resources owned by
nobody.12 One of these authors is Lawrence Lessig,
who defined the commons as ‘a resource that anyone
can draw upon without the permission of someone else’
(Lessig, 2009: 35. See also Lessig, 2001). Similarly, for
Michael Heller, the right of people not to be excluded
plays such an important role in defining the commons
that he coined the term of the ‘anticommons’ for property
regimes in which (multiple) owners can exclude others.13
Also the commons ‘pessimists’ – namely those
authors who see commons as vulnerable to overuse
and exploitation (Hardin, 1968; see also Feeny et al.,
1990) – typically assume commons to be governed by
open access regimes so that nobody can be excluded
from them. In contrast to those who consider the
impossibility to exclude a desirable feature, commons
pessimists see this as a problem.14 If anyone can use the
resource, they argue, then nobody has an incentive to
protect and invest in the resource either (for a discus-
sion of this point see Hess and Ostrom, 2003:121).
Hardin’s classical case of a shared grazing ground
that is depleted because it is overused by self-interested
cattle owners, however, has been criticised for confus-
ing commons with a rule-less ‘no-man’s-land’ (Bollier,
2014: 24) populated by people without concern for
others or for the resource as such.
Many commons scholars conceptualise commons as
consisting of a material resource in combination with
the rules and communities governing it. The material
resource can further be differentiated into stock units,
which make up the core resource, and fringe units,
which can be consumed without damaging the stock.
The typical resource that Ostrom and her collaborators
analysed in the first decades of commons scholarship
were fisheries, farmland and other resources that they
called common-pool resources. The essential characteris-
tics of common-pool resources are the aforementioned
possibility to exclude, and also that they are ‘subtract-
able’. This means that the degree to which a person uses
a resource subtracts from the potential use of others.
Good governance of common-pool resources thus
needs to avoid that mis- and overuse destroys the core
resource, and to ensure that those using it – so-called
appropriators – maintain and care for the commons.
Based on her analysis of actual cases of common-pool
resource uses, Ostrom distilled ‘design principles’ for the
governance of common-pool resources (which many
authors use synonymously with ‘commons’). In the fol-
lowing I use commons as a generic term for a jointly
owned and governed resource, whereas I use the term
common-pool resource in the way that Ostrom and her
collaborators defined it. To start with, to be open to the
possibility of good governance, a commons needs to
have clearly defined boundaries – both in terms of the
physical resource and regarding the owners of the com-
mons. In other words, it needs to be clear, for example,
where a grazing ground for sheep begins and ends, and
who the members of such a commons are. Second, gov-
ernance rules need to be appropriate to local conditions,
e.g., to the ecological conditions that the resource is part
of. There also need to be mechanisms for inclusive col-
lective decision making, and processes need to be in
place for the monitoring of appropriators. In case of
rule violations, graduated sanctions need to be applied,
and conflict resolutions must be fast and inexpensive.
The self-governance of the commons needs to be recog-
nised by the political and legal system that the commons
is surrounded by, so that nobody can interfere with what
the members of the commons decide. Last but not least,
governance should be organised in layers of nested enter-
prises (Ostrom, 1990; see also Agrawal, 2002).
Given that Ostrom has shown how common-pool
resources can be governed without damaging or des-
troying them, can we apply these design principles to
digital data and information commons?
Can there be data and information
commons? The challenge of data
multiplicity
For over a decade, authors have called for the creation
of commons in order to collectivise access to, and the
benefits of, digital data and information (e.g., Benkler,
2002; 2004; Hess, 2008). But can we think of digital
data and information as common-pool resources in
Ostrom’s sense? Can digital data and information
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form a commons to which Ostrom’s design rules could
be applied? I argue that we cannot, as I will lay out in
the next section.
The multiplicity of digital data and information
There is no doubt that digital data and information
require materiality to exist, including the human, nat-
ural and artefactual tools and infrastructures that
curate, store and process them (see also Leonelli
2016). But unlike letters, numbers or illustrations on a
piece of paper, a digital datum does not necessarily
correspond with only one specific material unit where
it ‘sits’. The materiality of digital data is distributed in
space and time. A patient’s health data may have a
specific ‘place’ on the hard drive in the hospital data-
base where it is stored, but it ‘moves’ to wherever it is
accessed from computers in different clinics or depart-
ments of these hospital, or the patient’s own computer
or mobile phone. Similarly, digital information in the
cloud can be downloaded to several electronic devices
in different parts of the world at the same time, and
permanently reside on these devices. In contrast to
data on paper that can also be torn up or burned or
irreversibly destroyed by other means, digital data
leaves traces even when they are deleted. In sum, digital
data is multiple in that it can be in several places at the
same time, and in that it can continue to exist in one
place when it was removed from another.15
It is the multiple nature of digital data that renders
the notion of control over data so complex. Regarding
a paper file in the hospital cabinet locker containing
patient data, we can establish with relative ease who
has control of the file. The doctor, nurse or administra-
tor, or other hospital staff decides who holds the keys to
the cabinet, who can see the file, who may carry it out
of the room, or who may even photocopy it. With digi-
tal data, establishing who has or could get access to the
dataset, and who controls how it is used, is much more
difficult. Given the crucial role that meaningful (collect-
ive) control plays in governance frameworks for com-
mons, this raises the question to what extent these
frameworks – and in particular, Ostrom’s design prin-
ciples – are applicable to digital data. A key aspect in
this regard pertains to ownership: As noted, ownership
(and, as some would argue, property rights) are a pre-
condition for effective governance because only owner-
ship enables parties to set rules and exclude those that
would exploit the commons without contributing to it.
But can we own, or even hold property rights, to some-
thing that is multiple, i.e., that exists in several places at
the same time?
Owning digital information and data: Data and
information commons
Legally, the answer is yes. Intellectual property rights
entitle the holders to exclusive and enforceable control
also over intellectual resources that are entirely non-
material. All jurisdictions grant intellectual property
rights in some form. But intellectual property rights
are typically given to artistic or creative artefacts,
such as inventions or artworks. The situation gets
more complicated when what is at stake are not ideas,
but instead personal data and information, namely –
using an EU definition16 – any information that relates
to an identified or identifiable living individual. Law
and theory put personal data and information in a sep-
arate category from other data and information as they
are seen to have a particularly close connection with
personhood. Personal data and information disclose
things about us and our lives that we may want to
keep confidential or even private, and that may harm
us if they are known or used by others. For these rea-
sons, most jurisdictions place restrictions on the collec-
tion and use of personal data. But there are crucial
differences in how personal data is protected.
In Europe, the predominant view has been to see per-
sonal data and information as belonging to people in a
moral sense, without being considered individual prop-
erty in the legal sense. That is, personal data is not con-
sidered something that can be sold.17 Instead, personal
data and information are protected by privacy rights,
which are ‘an integral part of being a citizen’ (Zwick
and Dholakia, 2001: 218). In this view, personal data
and information cannot be sold by those who possess
them, and must not be violated by others.18
In the United States, debates about whether personal
information should or could be viewed as property
have been complex. Some might argue that the idea
of property rights, understood – in William
Blackstone’s deliberately provocative description – as
‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual in the universe’ (Blackstone, 1979 [1765–1769]),
are one of the foundations upon which American soci-
ety was created. Others hold that this idea has never
corresponded with actual law; moreover, throughout
the 20th-century, the nature of property rights have
been reconceptualised as a bundle of rights (Heller,
1998: 661–662; see also Rose, 1998) that could be
held by different parties. These rights include the right
of enjoyment, the right of disposition and the right of
exclusion.
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As Nadezhda Purtova argues, in U.S. discourse, the
propertisation of personal information has served to
address three goals: First, to overcome the shortcom-
ings of U.S. data protection systems; second, to give
people control over their personal information; and
third, to provide incentives for companies to respect
privacy (Purtova, 2009: 507–508). Some U.S. authors
have argued that individual property rights are the only
way to ensure information privacy (Murphy, 1996; dis-
cussed in Purtova, 2009). This is because there is no
other way to ensure that people have meaningful and
effective control over their data in a legally enforceable
way.19 Following this rationale, property rights to per-
sonal information could be seen to take on the add-
itional role of addressing power asymmetries (Kang,
1998, discussed in Purtova, 2009).20 Other authors,
such as Jessica Litman, disagree with this stance,
arguing that ‘the raison d’être of property is alienabil-
ity’ (Litman, 2000: 1295). In this reading, property
rights encourage transferring property rights instead
of protecting them (see also Purtova, 2009). In other
words, if we see personal information as an inalienable
possession – that is, as something that we own in a
moral sense but that we cannot give away – then prop-
erty rights are unsuitable as a protective device. They
are unsuitable because they encourage the very thing
that the European approach deems morally inappropri-
ate (and ontologically impossible), namely the transfer
of exclusive rights to data.
I have proposed that digital data and information
are different from traditional physical common-pool
resources in that they are multiple, which makes it dif-
ficult to control them. The difficulty to effectively con-
trol the use of data in a genomic data repository is a
case in point: This information multiplies fast as people
download and share this information with others.
Irrespective of whether we deem property rights or
human rights regimes more appropriate to govern digi-
tal data and information, the effectiveness of either of
these may be jeopardised because of how difficult it is to
control digital data and information effectively. This, as
I will show in the next section, also hinders the applic-
ability of the design principles for the governance of
common-pool resources to digital data and information
commons.
Are the design principles for common-pool
resources applicable to digital data and
information commons?
As noted, Ostrom’s design principles for common-pool
resources start with the requirement that commons
need to have clearly defined boundaries – both in
terms of the physical resource and the owners of the
commons. Despite the fact that also ‘traditional’ com-
mons such as fisheries and grazing land also include
intangible things, such as the practices and values that
produce and reproduce the resource (see Benkler and
Nissenbaum, 2006; Linebaugh, 2008), digital data and
information are special in that they can be in several
places at the same time, when no central control point
exists that knows where they are located. This multipli-
city of digital data and information makes it extremely
difficult to meet the requirement of clear boundaries
(see also Purtova, 2017a).21
It could be tempting to dismiss Ostrom’s second
design principle, namely that governance rules need to
be appropriate to local conditions, by positing that
digital data and information commons are global
resources that have no specific local conditions. But
this would be rash. As many authors have argued
(e.g., Gitelman, 2013; Leonelli, 2016), the curation
and use of digital data and information is always
local insofar as it is dependent on the work of specific
people, instruments, infrastructures that are in turn
part of specific local configurations and contexts. At
the same time, because of the multiplicity of digital
data, these localities can be multiple for each data
point. A digital commons comprising health and med-
ical data from volunteers, for example, is local not only
in the sense that clinical data was collected according to
the rules and within the infrastructures of local health-
care systems, but also in the sense that the very biology
of the person reflects the locality of the person. A person
living in central London may suffer from respiratory
problems due to pollution, or even bear the marks of
epigenetic changes due to the bad air quality. In sum,
digital data and information are local in so many
respects that it is often not discernible how many and
what kind of localities datasets are part of. This also
relates to the previous point that digital data and infor-
mation commons typically have no clearly defined
boundaries. Thus, while matching governance rules to
local conditions would be possible, in theory, in the con-
text of digital data and information commons, because
of the multiple locations of digital data and information
and because of the distributed localities of who and
what they represent, it would be particularly difficult
to ensure that governance rules are well-matched to
local conditions.
The third to sixth design principles – inclusive
collective decision making, processes for monitoring
appropriators, graduated sanctions in case of
rule violations, and fast and inexpensive conflict
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resolution – can be realised in digital data and infor-
mation commons, as long as they are not governed by
open access regimes (res nullius).
Design principles seven and eight would again be
very difficult to realise with digital data and informa-
tion commons irrespective of the property regime they
are governed by. If it is not clear where the commons
starts and ends, and who the members are, then it will
be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish a self-
governance system for the commons that is recognised
by law. For the same reason would it also be hard to
organise governance in layers of nested enterprises.
In summary, the assumption that digital data and
information are (or can be treated analogous to) a
physical common-pool resource and be governed by
established principles designed for commons does not
stand up to scrutiny. Although digital data and infor-
mation clearly have material components, their materi-
ality is of a very different kind than the physical
resources that have been in the centre of commons
scholarship. The multiplicity of digital data and infor-
mation – the fact that they are distributed in time and
space – also means that some of the key design prin-
ciples developed for physical commons cannot be met.
While this means that we cannot answer questions
about the governance of digital commons by referring
to design principles developed for physical commons,
this does not imply that digital data and information
cannot be organised as commons at all. But it means
that digital commons require specific governance
frameworks, which is what I will turn next. I will
argue that systematic attention to who and what is
excluded from digital commons need to be a key con-
cern in designing and governing digital commons, espe-
cially if we intend commons to counteract existing
power asymmetries in our societies.
In- and exclusion in the data and
information commons
Within scholarship on the commons, including the digi-
tal data and information commons specifically, there
has been surprisingly little explicit discussion about
the categories, processes and effects of exclusion. Part
of the reason for this is the egalitarian rhetoric sur-
rounding ‘the Internet’. It suggests that web-based
tools and platforms are instruments for democratisa-
tion and egalitarianism because in principle, everybody
can use them. That this view of the Internet as a dem-
ocratisation machine is unduly naı̈ve has become widely
accepted over the last years (Morozov, 2011; Taylor,
2014), and increasing attention has been paid to the
extent to which the Internet in itself is made up of
enclosures (Schiffman and Gupta, 2013). It would be
wrong to assume, however, that the problem of exclu-
sion can be solved by applying open access regimes to
digital data and information from which nobody can be
excluded. As noted, the risk of overuse and ultimately
the destruction of the commons is highest when the
resource is not owned by anybody. For many of
those who see commons as a way to enhance public
benefit and public value, the conclusion that commons
should ideally be governed by public (state) property
regimes is plausible. But even this conclusion would be
too hasty: Inclusion and exclusion, and empowerment
and disempowerment, have complex relationships to
private and public property regimes. For example, as
Lezaun and Montgomery (2015) noted, private prop-
erty – for example in the form of intellectual property
entitlements – can be conducive to wider inclusion if
those with fewer rights and less power are actively
invited to contribute to, share and use the resource.
Correspondingly, the formally equal access for all citi-
zens22 that public property regimes typically offer can
mean, in practice, that those who are already powerful
can use public resources most effectively and against the
interests of others. This is the case when free university
education mostly benefits middle class students because
fewer working class students go to university, or when
rich and powerful land owners such as the British royal
family claim millions in farming subsidies from the
European Union (see also Taylor, 2014; Rose, 2003).
I argue that we should foreground the question of
how public value and public benefit can be increased
in digital commons arrangements in a way that is
applicable to all type of property arrangements, includ-
ing public and private ones. For this endeavour, prac-
tices, categories and effects of in- and exclusion are
crucial. Paying more systematic attention to practices
and categories of in- and exclusion in digital data and
information commons helps us to distinguish between
commons that have the potential to counteract struc-
tural asymmetries of power and those that do not.
Scrutinising the categories, processes and effects
of exclusion
Jodi Dean used the notion of ‘reflective solidarity’ to
draw attention to the need to critically reflect how and
where we draw boundaries around communities, how
we differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Reflective soli-
darity ‘refers to a mutual expectation of a responsible
orientation to relationship’ (Dean, 1996: 29) by which
responsibility signifies that we are accountable for who
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and how we exclude. Following Dean’s call for reflect-
ive solidarity means that we need to make explicit the
substantive values, norms and categories that make us
recognise similarities and commonalities with some
people and not others, and thus enact support for
some rather than others. This does not mean that dif-
ferences between people should be ignored or over-
come, or that exclusion is always problematic: Seeing
how and where we are different from others is a funda-
mental necessity of human and social life. Even the
most ‘radical’ relational accounts of personhood do
not negate the importance of some processes of other-
ing. Similarly, excluding people from using something
that is not of important value to them, or excluding
them from using something that they can easily use
elsewhere, is not problematic: If I exclude somebody
from access to my garden this is ok if this person has
her own garden down the street. It is more problematic
when the person cannot afford to have her own garden,
and when there are no communal gardens and parks
within her reach. When we replace gardens with health-
care in this example, then exclusion becomes even more
contentious. Exclusion is most problematic where it sig-
nificantly and negatively affects fundamental human
needs and interests, including healthcare, social ser-
vices, education and transportation, and, as increasing
numbers of people argue, also online connectivity.23
Much of the literature on digital data commons in
the realm of health has assumed that the best way of
going about this would be for people to actively and
voluntarily opt for their data to be included to com-
mons (e.g., Evans, 2016; Hafen et al., 2014; most of
these proposals envisage data governed by common
property regimes). I support this argument insofar as
the governance mechanisms of commons can help to
ensure that data and information are not used in
ways that are likely to incur significant and undue
harm to those whose data is included in these
commons.24
Problems with such inclusive databases in the health
domain arise (a) when people, whose data is in the
database, do not have a say in the databases govern-
ance, even if they would like to, and (b) when no appro-
priate harm mitigation instruments exist. The former is
exactly the problem that commons arrangements could
successfully address, if they give all those who contrib-
ute to the commons the possibility to participate in its
governance, and if collective governance mechanisms
are transparent and accountable to all contributors.
The latter issue, adequate harm mitigation instruments,
requires new measures that we have started to lay out in
a different publication (McMahon et al., 2019).
In sum, exclusion is not problematic in itself. When
and how it is acceptable to exclude depends on the
nature and function of the digital data commons, and
from what contributors are excluded. At the same time,
digital commons need to ensure that the risks to those
who are included are minimised and effective harm
mitigation mechanisms are in place in case harms do
occur. To meet the latter goal, it is important that those
who contribute to the commons are not excluded from
partaking in its governance.
There are four types of exclusion that need to be con-
sidered: (a) exclusion from (personal or other) data and
information entering a digital commons; (b) exclusion of
people from using data and information held in the digi-
tal commons; (c) exclusion of people from benefitting
from the digital commons (both data and infrastruc-
ture); and (d) exclusion of people from participation in
the governance of the commons (Table 3).
When somebody is prevented from having her per-
sonal data (or data and information that she generated)
included in a digital commons (scenario A), and when
this exclusion is unjust and it negatively affects her fun-
damental needs and interests (such as her access to
healthcare, credit, etc.), then such exclusion should be
avoided. A way to avoid it would be to give people in
such a situation the legal right to have their data and
information included in the commons.25 An example
would be a digital data and information commons for
public health surveillance where those whose data and
information were excluded could suffer significant
harms from policy decisions that do not meet their
needs.26 Such exclusion would be unjust if the reasons
for exclusion lie in factors that have no legitimate bear-
ing on the purpose of the database, such as excluding
people merely because they do not have Internet access,
or who are not included in electoral registers. In such
cases, legal provisions should give everybody the right
to have their data included (provided that quality and
other objective inclusion criteria are met). At the same
time, because such inclusion does not only have benefits
for the data subject but can also bear risks, it would be
important to ensure that governance and harm mitiga-
tion mechanisms are in place to reduce risks and miti-
gate or even compensate for harms.
A similar argument can be made for cases where
people are prevented from using, or benefitting from,
data and information held in digital commons, or
where those contributing to the commons are prevented
from participating in its governance (Table 3, Scenario
B to D). These forms of exclusion are to be avoided if
they are unjust27 and if they negatively affect the fun-
damental needs and interest of those who are excluded.
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Also here, we should resort to legal provisions that give
people the right to inclusion.
All digital data and information commons that pre-
vent people who seek to participate from contributing
to, using, or benefitting from the resource, or who
exclude some contributors from the governance of the
commons, should have mechanisms in place to scrutin-
ise practices and requirements that have bearing on
undue exclusion, as well as the effects that such exclu-
sion would have on the public value of the dataset, and
on those whose data and information excluded.28
Equally, justice considerations should guide the devel-
opment of every digital commons.
Once questions about undue conclusion have been
adequately considered, can other lessons learned from
the governance of physical commons be helpful at all
for devising rules of governance for digital commons? I
have argued that we cannot merely assume that digital
commons are common-pool resources and transpose
the design principles for physical commons to them to
ensure good governance. We can, however, adjust and
expand these design principles to better suit digital
commons (Table 4). First, although it is impossible
to clearly define the boundaries of the digital data
and information commons both in terms of the
core resource and the membership of the commons,
we can develop criteria to determine what is within
the scope of the commons and what is beyond. For
example, a commons comprising people’s health data
could include all personal data and information that
Table 3. Guide to critical reflection on the effects of four types of exclusion from digital commons.
A. Exclusion from including one’s (personal or other) data and information in a digital commons
Is the exclusion unjust? And: Does this exclusion negatively affect fundamental needs and interests of the excluded?
(Both questions answered with) Yes:
1. consider legal obligation to include, and
2. ensure that appropriate governance
and harm mitigation mechanisms in place
(At least one question answered with) No:
1. implement mechanisms for voluntary
participation, with critical reflection
on factual and formal barriers for inclusion,
2. consider how people who are not
included in the commons are affected
by the commons. Consider possible
benefits and harms, and
3. mitigate possible undue harms
B. Exclusion from using data and information held in the digital commons
Is the exclusion unjust? And: Does this exclusion negatively affect fundamental needs and interests of the excluded?
(Both questions answered with) Yes:
1. consider legal obligation to mandate use rights,
2. ensure that appropriate governance
and harm mitigation mechanisms are in place, and
3. ensuring that those who invest in the commons
are compensated for use by others who do not invest, if appropriate
(At least one question answered with) No:
1. consider how people who cannot
use data and information held in the
commons are affected by the commons.
Consider possible benefits and harms, and
2. mitigate possible undue harms
C. Exclusion from benefitting from the digital commons
Is the exclusion unjust? And: Does this exclusion negatively affect fundamental needs and interests of the excluded?
(Both questions answered with) Yes:
1. consider legal obligation to include everybody
in the commons, or alternatively
2. consider public provision of the same benefits
that the digital commons provides
(At least one question answered with) No:
1. consider how people who do not
benefit from the commons are
affected by the commons, and
2. mitigate possible undue harms
D. Exclusion from governance
Is the exclusion unjust? And: Does this exclusion negatively affect fundamental needs and interests of the excluded?
(Both questions answered with) Yes:
1. consider legal obligation to give every contributor
the possibility to participate in governance
(At least one question answered with) No:
1. consider how contributors are excluded
from governance of the commons
affected by the commons, and
2. mitigate possible undue harms
Source: Author.
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they consider relevant for their health; or they could
include all data that was generated in clinical contexts,
regardless of where they are held. We can also try to
ensure that the governance rules are well matched to
the nature of the commons; Ostrom’s original require-
ment of matching governance rules to local conditions
features here in the sense that the nature of digital data
and information commons is also shaped by the prac-
tices and circumstances of the localities where data and
information are created and used. To reflect the empha-
sis on critically scrutinising the categories, processes,
and effects of exclusion, governance rules should pro-
vide for regular reflection on these, to ensure that the
commons do not unduly exclude. Moreover, because
risk minimisation in the context of data use is not suf-
ficient to avoid harm, digital data and information
commons should also have good harm mitigation
instruments. Table 4 contains a schematic summary
of Ostrom’s principles for the governance of
common-pool resources, adjusted and amended for
digital commons.
Conclusion
This article started out with a discussion of the idea
of Big Data and of the growing power of for-profit
corporations in this domain. For some authors,
the best way to counteract the overarching power of
corporations is to expand the control that people
have over their digital data and information at the indi-
vidual level. Other authors within what I have called
the Collective Control approach see digital data and
information commons as a way in which the collective
power of data subjects can be exercised.
I argued that because of the multiplicity of digital
data and information, we cannot simply assume that
digital commons are (like) physical common-pool
resources and apply the design principles developed
for these to digital commons. I proposed that explicit
attention to the processes, categories and effects of
exclusion from digital data and information commons
is an important step in designing principles for digital
data and information commons. Moreover, structured
attention to who, how, and what is excluded from digi-
tal data and information commons, to what effects, and
how we can prevent undue and harmful exclusion
would also enable us to create commons that effectively
counteract current asymmetries in terms of resources
and power. It will also help to avoid the spread of a
commons rhetoric that ultimately seeks to foster the
interests of those who are already privileged and power-
ful in the digital data world. As De Peuter and Dyer-
Witheford (2010: 31) have observed, the
term commons has come to cover a proliferation of
proposals, some highly radical, but also some reform-
ist, and others even potentially reactionary. As George
Caffentzis points out, neoliberal capital, confronting
the debacle of free-market policies, is turning to ‘Plan
B’: limited versions of commons – be it carbon trading
models, community development schemes, biotechnol-
ogy research, and opensource practices – are intro-
duced as subordinate aspects of a capitalist economy.
Here voluntary cooperation does not so much subvert
capital as subsidize it.
In a world in which digital data and information
are such an important political, economic and social
Table 4. Adjusted and amended schematic summary of Ostrom’s principles for the governance of common-pool resources, adjusted
and amended for digital commons.
1 Clear criteria exist to determine what is within the scope of the commons and what is outside
2 Governance rules are well matched to the nature and purpose of the commons
3 Governance mechanisms include regular reflection on the categories, practices, and effects of exclusion and inclusion
4 The commons does not exclude unduly (i.e., exclusion is not unjust and does not negatively affect fundamental needs and
interests of the excluded)
5 Mechanisms for inclusive collective decision making exist
6 Accountable monitoring of appropriators exists
7 Graduated sanctions in case of rule violations exist
8 Fast and inexpensive conflict resolution exists
9 The self-governance of appropriators of the commons is recognised
10 Access to effective harm mitigation instruments exists
Adapted from Ostrom (1990). Italics mark adjustments and amendments.
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resource, it is important to create digital data and infor-
mation commons that enhance public value and public
benefit29 – regardless of whether it is a health data com-
mons that includes all people in a country, or an artistic
commons that includes only those with an interest in a
specific topic or art form. Importantly, some digital
data and information collections that are currently
not organised as commons might need to be turned
into such by law – if we are serious about avoiding
significant harm to those excluded.
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Notes
1. What is often referred to as the ‘five Vs’ of Big Data also
includes veracity. For reasons that will become apparent
in the course of the paper I am not including this in my
own list.
2. I am grateful to Alberto Giubilini for helpful discussions
on this point.
3. This argument is mostly made in connection with provi-
sions for data portability or the right to erasure, see
Rubinstein, 2013; Swire and Lagos, 2013; for counter-
arguments see Graef et al. 2017; Purtova, 2017a).
4. Some authors in the Collective Control group argue that
too much reliance on individual-level control is likely to
cause more harm than good, such as people ‘defensively
guard[ing] anonymized information about themselves’,
having lost sight of the good things that personal data
and information can do for people and societies
(Yakowitz, 2011: 4; see also Prainsack and Buyx, 2013).
5. As observed by Linnet Taylor, two main understandings
of ‘the public good’ have been prevalent in this debate: The
first is the idea that data should be used to help (public and
private) corporations to promote the social good in the
public sphere. An instantiation of this is Jane Yakowits’
definition of the data commons as comprising ‘of the dis-
parate and diffuse collections of data broadly available to
researchers with only minimal barrier to entry. We are all
in the data commons; information from our tax returns,
medical records, and standardized misuse by anonymiza-
tion’. (Yakowitz, 2011: 2–3). The second understanding
sees data as a public good due to its potential to promote
global health and mitigate crises and disparities within
and across societies (Taylor, 2016: 1–2). The latter
strand of scholarship focuses less on who should hold
and use data, but how and for whom the benefits of
Big Data should unfold. Calls for data sharing and
data philanthropy fall in this category (for an overview,
see Prainsack, 2017b, chapter 5, ‘Just profit?’). The first
strand of scholarship, in contrast, pays a lot of attention
to ownership of data – both in the legal sense of owner-
ship as in property rights to data, and in the moral sense
of ownership as control over, and responsibility for, data.
Although many authors writing on data commons are
also concerned with the benefits of data use, debates in
this strand tend to focus on the creation of digital data
and information commons, which are the focus of this
paper.
6. Birkinbine (2018: 296) goes as far as saying that we need
accounts of the commons ‘that incorporate a structural
critique of capitalism’.
7. In her 2008 paper on a surge of literature dealing with
‘new commons’ such as knowledge or health commons,
Hess (2008: 6) identified six main reasons (she calls them
‘entrypoints’) for authors to call certain resources com-
mons: 1. The need to protect a shared resource from
enclosure, privatisation or commodification; 2. the obser-
vation or action of electronic peer-production or mass
collaboration; 3. evidence of new types of tragedies of
the commons; 4. the desire to build civic education and
common-like thinking; 5. the identification of new or
evolving types of commons within traditional commons;
and 6. a rediscovery of the commons idea.
8. In the case of state-owned casinos, for example, state
authorities allow every person above a certain age to
access the venue; in the case of national forests, every-
body is allowed to access, etc.
9. Note that open access means something different here the
current dominant use of the term referring to the absence
of cost barriers in accessing a research output. Examples
for open access regimes in the way I use it here include the
open sea, or areas where jurisdictions deliberately guar-
antee access for everyone (e.g., beaches or forests). In the
information context of open access regimes, some intel-
lectual property rights can still appertain to the object or
resource. I am grateful to Edward Dove for helpful dis-
cussions on this point.
10. For example, while the land may technically be owned by
the state, the state respects traditional land use rights held
by local farmers.
11. Ostrom and her collaborators see the existence of certain
property rights as necessary for the good governance of
commons. These rights include access (right to enter a
defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits),
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extraction (right to obtain resource units or products of a
resource system), management (right to regulate internal
use patterns and transform the resource by making
improvements), exclusion (right to determine who will
have access rights and withdrawal rights, and how those
rights may be transferred), and alienation (right to sell or
lease management and exclusion rights) (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992; see also Hess and Ostrom, 2003).
12. This is reflected also in the definition of a commons
that Charlotte Hess (2008: 37) proposed in 2008: ‘a com-
mons is a resource shared by a group where the resource
is vulnerable to enclosure, overuse and social dilemmas.
Unlike a public good, it requires management and pro-
tection in order to sustain it’. Although we could plaus-
ibly challenge Hess’ assumption that public goods do not
require management and protection, this definition is
instructive also with regard the emphasis on the vulner-
ability of commons to enclosure, which makes this defin-
ition more fitting to digital data and information
commons than other, earlier definitions of Ostrom and
her collaborators (for a more detailed discussion of the
notion of enclosure and exclusion, see below).
13. To be exact, for a resource to meet Heller’s definition of
‘anticommons’, the following conditions need to be met:
multiple owners hold effective rights to exclude others
from the use of a scarce resource (Heller, 1998: 668).
Note that it is the fact that multiple owners each hold
elements within a bundle of property rights that distin-
guishes the anticommons from mere private property
(where one holder of a bundle of rights can exclude
others).
14. For them, commons are open access regimes, meaning
that nobody has property rights to a resource and it is
difficult to effectively exclude potential appropriators.
15. Nadezhda Purtova’s conceptualisation of personal data as
‘a system resource [. . .] encompassing ‘‘reincarnations’’ of
personal data on various stages of the data flow’ (Purtova,
2017b: 206) is particularly helpful in this respect.
16. This generic definition was taken from a website contain-
ing key terms pertaining to data protection (EU, 2018).
17. The difference of possession and ownership is that the
former describes a physical state and the latter a legal
entitlement to enforce exclusive control and transferabil-
ity. If my friend lends me a book then I possess it but do
not own it, which means that I can use it but must not
destroy or sell it.
18. What is descried here is an ideal type that is not realised
in this form in all European countries.
19. It is argued that this is the case also because property
rights protect entitlements in a better way than liability
rules: For transfers of property rights, the seller (in this
case, the data subject) determines the price of the entitle-
ment, whereas in the case of liability, a person destroying
the entitlement pays a predetermined sum that cannot be
changed by the owner of the entitlement (Calabresi and
Melamed, 1972, cited in Purtova, 2009). As Purtova
argues:
[u]nderstanding the US argument for propertization
from the angle of Calabresi and Melamed’s definition
of property makes it clear that within this analytical
framework only property regime offers some degree
of control and protection to personal data. Any alter-
native (liability) rule only secures transfer of personal
data, albeit against some objectively defined compensa-
tion. (Purtova, 2009: 216)
20. In fact the argument that ‘true’ anonymisation of data –
in the sense that data cannot be traced back to the person
they come from – is impossible has led some authors to
argue that the only effective way to protect personal data
is via treating it as personal property (for an overview see
Yakowitz, 2011: 3). In another place, colleagues and I
have countered this argument by proposing that the
answer to the impossibility of anonymisation should be
the enhancement of collective public ownership and con-
trol over data, and the strengthening of harm mitigation
instruments (Prainsack, 2017a, 2017b; Prainsack and
Buyx, 2013, 2016, 2017).
21. Those approaches that treat open access regimes as con-
stitutive for data and information commons face the add-
itional problem of not being able to define who can use
the resource and who cannot, so that appropriators are
not defined clearly either.
22. Save certain inclusion or exclusion criteria that are
applicable to all citizens equally, such as medical indica-
tions in publicly owned hospitals, age restrictions or dress
codes in publicly owned casinos, forbidden behaviours in
public forests, etc.
23. For example, the proposal made by a prominent group of
British scholars for the implementation of Universal
Basic Services in the UK included the provision of free
basic phone and Internet access next to social housing,
free bus travel, and meals for those in need (e.g., Portes
et al., 2017).
24. Harm is significant when it impacts the life of a person in
significant and negative ways, and it is undue when there
is no legal or important ethical reason to justify the harm.
25. For commons governed by state property regimes, this
would be relatively easy to do as state authorities are
tasked with determining criteria of exclusion and inclu-
sion anyhow. For commons governed by private property
regimes, state authorities could mandate certain min-
imum inclusion criteria by means of regulatory frame-
works within which commons can self-govern.
26. How fundamental needs and interests are defined merits a
longer discussion than could be provided in this paper.
An acceptable – albeit incomplete – answer would be that
the reflection could be guided by the fundamental needs
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and interests of citizens that legal frameworks and public
institutions in a given country acknowledge as such.
27. Exclusion would not be considered unjust, for example, if
it applied only to those who did not contribute to the
commons although they easily could have (e.g., a digital
commons of medical images for training artificial intelli-
gence that somebody freely chose not to contribute their
own medical images to). In the case of exclusion from
governing the commons, this is problematic only if it
affects those who contributed in the commons in the
first place, and if it is unjust and negatively affects fun-
damental needs and interests.
28. The following list of 15 questions was adapted from
Prainsack (2017a) for digital data and information com-
mons specifically:
A. Coordination: Who has influence in:
1. Agenda setting: What is the purpose of the commons?
Who should it benefit, and how?
2. Determining the terms of the execution of the idea/pro-
cedural aspects of the data commons
3. Deciding on intellectual property questions
B. Participation
4. Who participates (demographic and social parameters
of those who participate)? Why, and how do they
participate?
5. What physical (including technological) and financial
resources are required to participate?
6. How much, and what kind of, training, skill, or expert-
ise is required to participate?
7. Are there cultural, institutional, or other differences in
perception and framing of core issues and stakes?
C. Community
8. What forms of community pre-exist the establishment of
the commons, if any? Which new communities does the
commons facilitate or give rise to? What is the consti-
tutive factor for the feeling of belonging on the side of
the participants?
D. Evaluation:
9. Who decides what good outcomes are? How?
10. What happens to the results of these evaluations?
E. Openness:
11. What data do participants have access to, and how?
What can they do with the data?
12. Who curates/edits/cleans the data?
13. Is the contribution of all participants adequately
acknowledged?
F. Entrepreneurship:
14. How are the financial needs of the commons met?
15. How are for-profit and other interests aligned in this
commons (and/or do they conflict, and where?)
29. I will discuss the meaning and operationalisation of
public value and public benefit in a separate paper.
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